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attorney-at-law 
katalin@andreides.tv 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Today, global economic performance largely depends on digital ecosystems. E-
commerce, cloud, social media, sharing economy are the main products of the modern 
innovative economic systems which are constantly raising new regulatory questions.  
Meanwhile the United States has an unimpeachable dominance in innovation and new 
technologies, as well as a large and open domestic market, the EU is only recently 
discovering the importance of empowering the European digital economy and aims to 
break down its highly fragmented cross-border online economic environment. As global 
economy is rapidly becoming digital, Europe’s effort to create and invest in common 
digital market is understandable.  
 
The comprehensive investigations launched by the European Commission into the role 
of social network, search engine, or sharing economy internet platforms, which are new 
generation technologies dominated by American firms; or the recent decision of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union declaring that the Commission’s US Safe 
Harbor Decision is invalid
1
 might be considered as part of an anti-American 
protectionist policy. However, these measures could rather be seen as part of a broader 
trend to foster European enterprises in technology developments.  
 
In any case, today the European Commission is concerned with a market where 
European citizens are afforded the same capacity to innovate that have the American 
technology giants: After a five-years investigation and unsuccessful efforts of bringing 
the case to an end by a negotiated settlement, the Commission formally accused Google 
of abusing its dominance in web searches.
2
  
 
Through presenting Google’s antitrust cases in the United States and in the European 
Union, this paper aims to assess the following: First, the new challenges that 
competition authorities are facing in the process of enforcing competition law regarding 
businesses operating in digital economy markets, focusing mainly on the application of 
competition rules on the prohibition of abusing conduct. The nature of competition in 
the new economy is relatively different from traditional markets, therefore competition 
analysis and the application of competition law rules in these markets might be 
different. Second, under different jurisdiction competition authorities may reach very 
different conclusion in the applications of competition rules. Though companies in new 
digital economy are operating in a global level, they are often subject to different 
competition law systems, drawn up potentially with different mentality and approaches.  
 
                                                          
1
 Case C-362/14 “Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner” (2015) 
2
 European Commission Press Release IP/15/4780, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections 
to Google on comparison shopping service; opens separate formal investigation on Android , Brussel, 15 
April, 2015 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4780_en.htm  
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Chapter 1 introduces Google Inc, with a description of its strong position and of its 
main internet-based services and products, briefly mentioning also competition 
concerns resulting from the particularities of Google’s position. Chapter 2 and chapter 3 
assess antitrust cases against Google in the United States in front of the Federal Trade 
Commission, and in the European Union in front of the European Commission, 
presenting Google’s alleged anticompetitive business practices and the different 
approaches of the American and European competition authorities. Chapter 3 analyses 
also the European Competition procedural background applied by the European 
Commission and finally, Chapter 4 concludes this paper with a final assessment of the 
emerged competition concerns concentrating on Google’s questioned practices 
individually.   
 
II. Google’s search engine services 
 
1. Google, the leading search engine provider  
 
When Microsoft acquired a 10-year exclusive license to Yahoo’s search technologies 
and notified the operation to the European Commission for regulatory clearance under 
European Union’s Merger control law3, the Commission’s preliminary investigation 
indicated that in the European Economic Area (EEA) Microsoft’s and Yahoo’s 
activities in online web-wide algorithmic search and search advertising are very limited, 
as 90-100% of search users perform searches on Google, and only 20-30% on Microsoft 
and 10-20% on Yahoo. The investigation illustrated the importance of Google in 
Europe, generally enjoying market share above 90%, while Microsoft’s and Yahoo’s 
combined market shares is generally below 10%, with relatively small share of search 
users who considers the latter to run their searches.
4
  
 
Arguably, this percentage represents a very large market share, of which existence may 
indicate Google’s market power on the relevant online search and online advertising 
market, as the ECJ underlined the importance of this factor through its several decisions 
from the past. Also the European Commission expressed its position as regards 
Google’s dominance concluding that the described market shares level is higher than in 
many other parts of the world mentioning also the significant barriers to entry and 
network effects in both markets.
5
  
 
In this market situation, Google’s conduct raised competition concerns in relation to the 
abuse of this dominance, which this thesis will mainly focus on.  
 
Prior to assess these concerns, a short description of the functioning of internet search 
engines may be useful and a review of the services provided through this system is 
indispensable.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Council Regulation (EC) NO 139/2004 (“EC Merger Regulation”) 
4
 Case No. COMP/M.5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf. The 
data indicated shows the probability that users will use a particular search engine within a month in 
Europe. 
5
 European Commission Memo 13/383, “Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google 
to address competition concerns – questions and answers” 25/04/2013.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-383_en.htm 
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2. The functioning of internet search engines 
 
Internet search engines are crucial for locating and accessing the huge amount of digital 
content. Search engines like those operated by Google, Microsoft or Yahoo use 
algorithms to search for information on the internet through special software application 
that indexes the web content. The algorithms have their important role to analyze and 
index web pages, and thus determine the relevant parts of the websites. In search result 
pages the ranking for any given query of information is determined by these search 
engine algorithms.
6
 When thus building up a ranking method or developing a website 
with the goal to rank it high and if the variables in these algorithms are known they can 
be taken account and the algorithms can be “pleased”. However, by doing this the 
results may be manipulated.
7
 Further, internet search engine providers update or change 
their algorithms relatively often simply for innovative purposes. Still, these updates may 
be considered as a tool of manipulation and may result in demotion of websites 
considered competitors.
8
 
 
Google’s search ranking system for recommending websites has been questioned and 
reviewed by both European and American competition authorities in the last few years. 
Allegations concern the unfair manipulation of search results and basically the way 
Google abuses its dominant search engine to stifle competition. 
 
3. Google’s online search and online advertising services 
 
As noted, Google, for its general search service, has an important market share in it the 
European Economic Area (EEA). Beside its general search, Google offers specialized 
search services as well. Specialized search engine services or vertical internet search 
services deliver more relevant and specific search results to the users. Examples include 
Google Shopping, which specializes in the search for products, Google Places, which 
specializes in the search for local businesses, Google News, which specializes in search 
for news or Google Flights which specializes in search for air travel directions.
9
 
Moreover, Google provides users with sponsored links of advertisers operating also in 
online search advertising market. Website publishers can display on their own websites 
advertisements provided by Google ("AdSense for Search") or by rival search engines. 
Search engines earn money every time a user clicks on these search advertisements.
10
 
Google operates its AdWords advertising program as well, in which advertisers bid for 
several keywords related to their business and can choose a short text line (ad) which is 
shown on Google’s search results when the keywords correspond to the search enquiry 
of the user. Undertakings shall pay only if users click on their ads and land on their 
                                                          
6
 Case No. COMP/M.5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf. 
7
 Pepijn J. P. Nielsen: Legal Status of Search Engine Result Manipulation, Tilburg University-Tilburg 
Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT) 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=127401 , p. 10. 
8
 Pepijn J. P. Nielsen: Legal Status of Search Engine Result Manipulation, Tilburg University-Tilburg 
Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT)  
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=127401, p. 9. 
9
 European Commission Press Release IP 13/371 Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on 
Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns 25/04/2013 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-371_en.htm  
10
 European Commission Press Release IP 13/371 Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on 
Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns, 25/04/2013 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-371_en.htm 
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website – not when their ad is displayed.11 Due to its profitability, search advertising is 
an important part of every search engine's business. 
 
Google’s search engine thus provides two types of result; the first one is “unpaid” 
search results which are sometimes also referred to as “natural”, “organic” or 
“algorithmic” search results, and the second one is “paid third party advertisements” 
shown at the top and/or at the right side of the Google’s search results page often 
referred as to “paid” search results or “sponsored links”.12 Users, therefore, conducting 
a search on internet receive on the result page both organic search results provided by 
the search engine and sponsored links with advertisements referring to their query. 
Under circumstances, this specificity may lead to prominent market position with 
important competition concerns. 
 
4. Competition concerns
13
 
 
4.1 Market specificity: two-sided market 
 
As noted above, Google’s search engine operates in a two-sided platform, one for 
internet users, and one for advertisers. This platform has two well distinguishable user 
groups that provide each other with network benefit: The more online users use 
Google’s online search engine, the more crucial it becomes for advertisers.  Obviously, 
a very high market share resulting from the large preference of this internet search 
engine by internet users makes largely more attractive the choice of it by advertisers 
compared to Google’s competitors. Basically, Google attracts traffic with its free search 
functionality and sells the potentiality of this traffic to advertisers to generate its 
revenue. This specificity represents indirect network effect between the two sides of the 
platform. The larger the platform is, the more interesting it gets for the advertisers as 
there are higher chance that users will become purchaser. Indirect network effects thus 
bring value to both users and advertisers. Subject to the foregoing, when it comes to 
market definition, it has to be considered that these markets have platforms which 
operate with two markets strictly linked to each others. 
 
4.2. Market shares 
 
Market definition is used to calculate market shares in the relevant market. Looking at 
market share, based on views of websites (web traffic), Google has had a strong 
position in online search and online advertisement with very limited number of 
competitors, and has been maintaining this position since 2008. This dominance in the 
relevant market may give raise to competition concerns for allegations of abuse its 
dominant position relating to, for instance, alleged unfavorable treatment of competing 
search services companies. 
 
4.3. Market power 
 
Market share must be put in relation to potential competitive constraints in order to 
determine whether Google actually has market power and can act independently of 
                                                          
11
 http://adwords.google.com  
12
 European Commission Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations 
by Google” IP/10/1624, 30. 11. 2010. 
13
 Case No. COMP/M.5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf. 
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customers, its competitors and ultimately of consumers. Barriers are clear as far as the 
entrance of the competitors are concerned: Although the relevant market is a market in 
which high profits are potentially made and it attracts new businesses, the indirect 
network effects are strong and therefore as each side of the market grows, it gets more 
difficult for new entrants to compete.
14
 
 
In high-tech markets in particular, network effect may lead to entrenched market 
position. As it will be assessed, according the European Commission, Google’s position 
seems likely that no web search service will replace it as European users’ web search 
service of choice
15
, and it does not seem to be under the threat of potential new entry.  
 
Also the possibility of consumers to switch to another service and the switching cost 
should be analyzed at both sides of the platform. Concerning Internet search, Internet 
users and consumers must be well informed and know what to expect from their search 
query or/and be convinced that the other search engine in question offers the same 
quality as Google
16
. However, this is not the case, especially when internet users have 
no background information on the subject matter and thus have no information to 
determine the quality of the results. As it was mentioned before, with regard to 
advertisers, switching costs are remarkably higher as a result of network effect. 
 
If Google’s high market share is coupled with high switching cost especially on the side 
of advertisers, it suggests that Google has market power and can be perceived as a 
dominant player in several online markets, including online search and online 
advertisement.  
 
III. The U.S. Antitrust Experience
17
 
 
 
In June 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
18
 launched a comprehensive 
competition investigation into Google's business practices. 
At the time when the investigations were launched, press articles, often cited 
Microsoft’s long-running case from the 1990’s, which had important consequences on 
US antitrust policy, as well as on Microsoft’s ability to exploit its dominance and 
particularly on its public image. The press recalled these events as risks that Google 
might have also faced. However, when it came to the final statement of the FTC 
                                                          
14
 Case No. COMP/M.5727-Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf. 
15
 European Commission Press Release IP 13/371 Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on 
Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns 25/04/2013 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-371_en.htm 
16
 Associated Press: “ Google’s Search Ranking Methods under Scanner” 04/09/2010  
http://gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/news/google-search-ranking-methods-under-scanner-227117  
17
 Unlike in Europe, in the United States antitrust enforcement system is based on criminal law, with 
financial and custodial penalties against individuals. (The European system is administrative and firms 
involved in anti-competitive practices may be penalized with fines.) Competition laws are enforced at the 
federal level by the Antitrust Division of Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. 
Where antitrust cases can’t be settled the courts take the final decision. However, in the United States 
private enforcement plays a grater role through the U.S. civil court system and in antitrust cases parties 
can go directly go to the court for redress of damages caused by anti-competitive practices.   
EU and US competition policies. Similar objectives, different approaches. The European Parliamentary 
Research Service 27/03/2014 
18
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the United States government, 
established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
6 
 
regarding Google’s search practices, it was clear that Google managed to avoid antitrust 
charges and predicted consequences in the United States. 
 
1. Competition concerns regarding Google’s anticompetitive practices 
 
As noted, the FTC was deluged by complaints from companies claiming that Google is 
using its dominant position to thwart competition: 
i.) Complaints mainly concerned allegations that Google favored its own properties in 
vertical search results. According to some vertical websites, Google’s Universal Search 
Service has been used to promote Google’s own services while discriminating the 
search rankings of competing website and other vertical search engines.
19
 Google’s 
Universal Search Service was introduced in 2007. This system returns more than just 
the traditional text results. Searching for a query, this service brings information also 
images, shopping information, video, blog spot and so on about the query.    
The introduction of Google’s Universal Search, was considered as a kind of 
modification in its search result page, which helped display Google’s vertical search 
results in response to certain types of queries and consequently demoted competitors’ 
websites.  
Public complaints were drawn from travel sites like Expedia and Trip Advisor, health 
site Web MD.com and local-business reviews sites Yelp.com and Citysearch.com, 
among others.
20
 
ii.) Google’s above mentioned vertical competitors presented their complaints claiming 
also that Google misappropriated competitors’ websites content without consent or 
compensation in order to improve its own products. This conduct might also be 
considered harmful to competition as it potentially harms incentives to innovation. In 
addition, Google was accused of threatening its competitors to delist them entirely from 
Google’s search results when they protested the misappropriation of their content.21 
iii.) Other allegations that the FTC investigated were that Google placed unreasonable 
restrictions on the ability of advertisers to simultaneously advertise on Google and 
competing search engines. Small businesses thus were unable to use tools provided by 
third parties to manage advertising campaign on both Google and other competing 
advertising platforms, a practice known as ”multi-homing”22 
iv.) Many of Google's critics wanted the Commission to go further in its investigation 
and regulate the intricacies of Google's search engine algorithm. Complaints charged 
that Google manipulated its search algorithms in order to demote competitors’ vertical 
websites. 
As Fairsearch.org, a group representing several Google critics, including Microsoft and 
Expedia Inc., Kayak.com. and others, clearly summarized: “Google engages in 
anticompetitive behavior that harms consumers by restricting the ability of other 
                                                          
19
 FTC. Release “Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns 
in the Market for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tables and in Online Search.” 1/03/2013 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm 
20
 The Wall Street Journal: Feds to Lunch Probe of Google. June 24, 2011 – Europe Edition 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576403603764717680.html 
21
 For example, Google allegedly “scarped” the user generated reviews of local restaurants displayed on 
Yelp, and led consumers believe that these reviews were its own. 
Google Press Conference, Opening Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowitz as 
Prepared for Delivery, 3/1/2013 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/130103googleleibowitzremarks.pdf 
22
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of 
Google Inc. FTC File Number: 111-0163. 3/1/2013. 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
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companies to compete to put the best products and services in the front of the Internet 
users who should be allowed to pick winners and losers, not Google.”23 Basically, 
Google is, allowed by its market power, potentially able to determine whether a 
business shall succeed or fail. 
 
2. The FTC’s investigation 
 
According to the FTC’ statement on Google’s anticompetitive practices, the 
investigation on  the above described allegations represented a broad, comprehensive 
research based on over nine million pages of documents, numerous industry 
participants’ interviews, key Google executives hearings and staff economics’ empirical 
analyses.
24
 
The FTC has powers to intervene and challenge business practices if it has reason to 
believe that such practices violate Section 5 of FTC Act which prohibits the unfair 
methods of competition, and create a likelihood of significant injury to competition, 
including monopolization or attempted monopolization actionable under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act.
25
 
i.) Search algorithm and search result page modification 
To determine if Google violated the above mentioned relating laws, the FTC had to 
consider whether Google manipulated its search algorithm and search result page in 
order to impede a competitive threat posed by vertical search engines, and prominently 
display its own vertical search results.  
According to the FTC statement, although Google is a horizontal search engine seeking 
to cover the Internet as completely as possible, delivering a comprehensive list of 
results to any query; and vertical search engines are not wholesale substitutes for 
general purpose search engines, they still present consumers with an alternative to 
Google for specific categories searches.
26
  
Within this context, the FTC analyzed whether Google changed its search results 
primarily to exclude actual or potential competitors, or to improve the quality of its 
search product and overall user experience. The FTC found that evidences were “largely 
consistent” with the conclusion that Google likely benefited consumers by introducing 
its vertical content through its Universal Search and had notably positive effect on the 
quality of its general search results. The FTC refined that Google’s primary goal was to 
quickly answer and better satisfy its users’ search queries by providing directly relevant 
                                                          
23
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of 
Google Inc. FTC File Number: 111-0163. 3/1/2013. 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
24
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of 
Google Inc. FTC File Number: 111-0163. 3/1/2013. 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
25
 The US Congress passed the Sherman Act as federal statute in 1890 to combat anticompetitive 
practices, reduce market domination by individual corporations, and preserve unfettered competition as 
the rule of trade. The Sherman Antitrust Act forms the foundation and the basis for most federal antitrust 
litigation. The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) from 1914 completed the Sherman Act providing 
that the FTC could proactively and directly protect consumers rather than only offer indirect protection by 
protecting business competitors. Section 5 of the FTCA gives broad powers to cope with new threats to 
the competitive free market. The FTC was subject to several critics discussing the fact that Commission 
sued Google not under traditional antitrust law (the Sherman Act) but instead by alleging unfair 
competition under Section5 of the FTCA. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust     
26
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of 
Google Inc. FTC File Number: 111-0163. 3/1/2013. 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
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information and any negative impact on potential competitors was incidental to that 
purpose, describing this effect as a common byproduct of “competition on the merit”.27 
The FTC concluded that the introduction of Universal Search as well as additional 
changes made to Google’s search algorithm – even those that may have had the effect of 
harming individual competitors – could be plausibly justified as innovations that 
improved Google’s product and the experience of its users.  
ii.) Competing websites’ content misappropriation 
The FTC considered whether this conduct could have diminished the incentive of 
Google’s competitors to invest in bringing new and innovative content and services to 
the Internet in the future or reduced Google’s own incentive to innovate in the relevant 
market. Some Commissioners expressed strong concerns about Google’s conduct in this 
regard. 
iii.) Unreasonable restrictions towards advertisers 
Advertisers who wish to use a search advertising platform spend considerable time, 
effort, and resources preparing extensive bids, including keywords, price information, 
and targeting information. Once an advertiser has entered the information necessary to 
create a search advertising campaign, the advertising platform sends critical data back to 
the advertisers that they need to evaluate the effectiveness of, and to further manage, 
their campaign. Advertising platforms use application programming interfaces, known 
as APIs, to give advertisers direct access to these advertising platforms so they can 
develop their own software programs to automatically manage and optimize their 
advertising campaigns.
28
 
Some FTC Commissioners were concerned that Google’s contractual conditions 
governing the use of its API made it more difficult for an advertiser to simultaneously 
manage a campaign on AdWords and on competing ad platforms, and that these 
restrictions might impair competition in search advertising.
29
 
The FTC’s investigation on unreasonable restrictions suggested that while most large 
advertisers who were not affected by Google’s contractual restrictions preferred to 
“multi-home”, multi-homing by small advertisers affected by Google’s restrictions was 
much less common. Some Commissioners were concerned by the tendency of Google’s 
restrictions to raise the cost of small businesses and using the power of internet search 
advertising to grow their businesses. 
30
 
iv.) Google’s commitments 
In a separate Letter of Commitments to the FTC, Google made important commitments 
considered significant alteration on the above described practices.  
In its letter, Google committed to make available a web based notice form that provides 
website owners with the option to put out from display on Google’s current Shopping, 
G+Local, Flights, Hotels and Advisor web pages of content from their websites that has 
been crawled by Google. When a website owner exercise this option, Google ceases 
displaying crawled content from the domain name designated by the website owner on 
                                                          
27
 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of 
Google Inc. FTC File Number: 111-0163. 3/1/2013. 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf 
28
 FTC. Release “Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns 
in the Market for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tables and in Online Search.” 1. 03. 2013. 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm 
29
 FTC. Release “Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns 
in the Market for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tables and in Online Search.” 1. 03. 2013. 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm 
30
 Google Press Conference, Opening Remarks Of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowitz 
As Prepared for Delivery January 3, 2013. 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/130103googleleibowitzremarks.pdf   
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google.com domain in the United States. Thus Google committed to refrain from 
content appropriation in the future.
31
 
The other important commitment concerned the contractual restriction towards 
advertisers. Google agreed to remove from its AdWords API Terms and Conditions the 
AdWords API Input and Copying Restrictions for all AdWords API licensees with a 
primary billing address in the United States. In addition, Google committed not to add 
any new provision to its AdWords API Terms and Conditions, or adopt new technical 
requirements in connection with the use of its online advertisement platform that can 
potentially result in barriers for advertisers to coordinate online advertising campaigns 
across multiple platforms.
32
  
In sum, while not everything Google did was beneficial, on balance, as the FTC 
summarized, the evidences presented did not support the allegations that Google’s 
display of its own vertical content at or near the top of its search results page was 
product change undertaken without a legitimate business justification. Rather, the 
display of Google’s own content could plausibly be viewed as an improvement in the 
overall quality of Google’s search product. Similarly, the FTC did not find sufficient 
evidence that Google manipulated its search algorithm to unfairly disadvantage vertical 
competitors. Although, some vertical websites experienced demotions, in the Federal 
commission’s view it was a consequence of algorithm changes that also could plausibly 
be viewed as an improvement in the quality of Google’s search results.33  
The FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz commented the case, “some may believe we should 
have done less” in this case, but also adds: “Some may believe the Commission should 
have done more, because they are locked in hand-to-hand combat with Google around 
the world and have the mistaken belief that criticizing us will influence the outcome in 
other jurisdictions.”34 Wouldn’t it be a slight aversion to the European approach?  
 
IV. The European Antitrust Fight 
  
The protection of competition is the main objective in both American and European 
legal systems. However, as it will be described in the following, while the more 
economic American approach underlines consumer welfare, the European view aims to 
protect the freedom to compete.   
In Europe, Google has been facing similar issues. Aversions, however, to the European 
approach were reflected in critics accusing the European Commission of relying too 
much in competitors’ complaints rather than on evidence on consumer harm. Although, 
alleged pressure from competitors to give Google a decisive punishment would lead the 
European competition authorities to handle the Google-case with a hard-line approach, 
European officials insist on focusing consumers’ interest. 35    
On the 30
th
 of November 2010, the European Commission officially announced its 
decision to open an antitrust investigation into allegations that Google abused a 
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 Commitment Letter from Google Inc. to Chairman Leibowitz, File No. 111-0163 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf  
32
 Commitments Letter From Google Inc to Chairman Leibowitz 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf  
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 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of 
Google Inc. FTC File Number: 111-0163. January 3, 2013. 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf   
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 Google Press Conference, Opening Remarks Of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowitz 
As Prepared for Delivery January 3, 2013. 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/130103googleleibowitzremarks.pdf    
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 The Wall Street Journal: Feds to Lunch Probe of Google. June 24, 2011 – Europe Edition 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576403603764717680.html 
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dominant position in on-line search. Decision based on the violation of European Union 
competition rules, Article 102 TFEU
36
, which prohibits the abuse of dominant position 
within the internal market by an undertaking in so far it may affect trade between 
Member States. The opening of formal proceedings followed complaints by search 
service providers about unfavorable treatment of their services in Google’s unpaid and 
sponsored search results with an alleged preferential placement of Google’s own 
services.
37
  
Complaints were made by a price comparison site from the United Kingdom, Foundem, 
by a French legal search engine ejustice.fr, and by a German shopping site Ciao!, owned 
by Microsoft. These vertical search engines, thus direct competitors to Google, claimed 
that their sites were demoted in Google’s search results, and that Google had the ability 
to arbitrarily penalize rivals and systematically favor its own services. Foundem said in 
its filing of complaint that Google’s Universal Search was a “mechanism for 
automatically inserting its own services into prominent positions within its natural 
search results and poses an immediate threat to healthy competition and innovation”.38  
However, before entering in details of the Commission’s investigations and competition 
concerns, I would describe the procedural background of the enforcement focusing on a 
relatively new instrument of the European Commission for antitrust scrutiny of 
companies’ behavior and, how the flexibility of its use may help to ensure the 
application of the relevant European competition rules within the internal market. 
 
1. The European Commission, the main body in charge of ensuring the application of 
European competition rules 
 
1.1. Enforcement of European competition principles 
 
According to Article 105 TFEU, the European Commission shall ensure the application 
of the principles laid down in Article 101
39
 and 102. On application by a Member State 
                                                          
36
 Art. 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union: (ex Article 82 TEC) 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
37
 European Commission Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations 
by Google” IP/10/1624, 30. 11. 2010 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en  
38
 BBC News: Google Faces European Competition Inquiry, 24, February, 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8533551.stm  
39
 Art. 101 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union: (ex Article 81 TEC) 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
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or on its own initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the 
Member States, which shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall investigate 
cases of suspected infringement. If it finds that there has been an infringement, it shall 
propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end. 
The Article 103 of the Treaty then empowers the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, to set out the appropriate 
regulations or directives to give effect to the competition principles of the European 
Union.
40
  
 
1.2. Secondary legislation on enforcement 
 
The first generation of the secondary legislation on the enforcement ensured a strong 
role for the Commission. Regulation 17/62/EEC, which is no longer in force, 
established a “quasi-monopoly” for the Commission regarding the enforcement of 
European competition principles.  
The Regulation 1/2003/EC
41
, second generation of secondary legislation, however, 
introduced important changes in the field of the implementation of the rules on 
competition and established the “European Competition Network”, by laying down the 
basis of a close cooperation between the Commission and the national competition 
authorities and national courts. As the Commission Notice on the cooperation within the 
network of competition authorities states: “The Network is a forum for discussion and 
cooperation in the application and enforcement of EC competition policy. It provides a 
framework for the cooperation of European competition authorities in case where 
Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty are applied and is the basis for the creation and 
maintenance of a common competition culture in Europe.”42  
Therefore, an initiation of a proceeding by the Commission for the adoption of a 
decision relieves the competition authorities of the Member States of their authority to 
apply the competition rules laid down in the relevant articles of the Treaty.
43
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does 
not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part 
of the products in question. 
40
 Article 103 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
41
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty (in force since 1 May 2004) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:l:2003:001:0001:0025:en:PDF  
42
 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of competition authorities. Eur-lex. ID celex 
52004xc0427(02) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0427(02):EN:NOT  
43
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Article 11 (6) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:l:2003:001:0001:0025:en:PDF 
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The Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 introduced also a more 
important element as regard the theme of this study: a new form of resolving 
competition infringement cases, the possibility of undertakings to offer commitments to 
meet Commission’s competition concerns.44 
 
1.3. Decision making commitments 
 
The Commission may decide to investigate possible breaches based on its own 
initiative, as a consequence of a complaint or based on information provided by possible 
infringers. 
 
At a certain point of a considerable investigative work, the Commission may inform the 
undertaking concerned in writing of the objections raised against them by sending a 
Statement of Objections.
45
 This declaration represents a formal step in Commission’s 
antitrust investigation, and often results as a significant alteration to business practices 
of a dominant company. Therefore, this is an instrument which is efficient in 
proceedings where the imposition of decision stating that there is an infringement is 
necessary
46
, or imposition of financial penalties would be appropriate.
47
  
Unsurprisingly, applying the option provided by Article 9 of the EU Antitrust 
Regulation, undertakings try to avoid the point where a SO would be issued in an 
investigation, but even when a SO is already issued, the companies have the possibility 
to negotiate a settlement by offering commitments to remedy Commission’s concerns.  
Article 9 specifies, where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an 
infringement be brought to an end, undertaking concerned may offer, voluntarily, 
commitments to meet the concerns expressed to it by the Commission in its preliminary 
assessment, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the 
undertaking. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude 
that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.
48
  
i.) The aim 
The aim of the introduction of commitment decisions was to make enforceable 
commitments made in an informal way by the undertakings, as even before the Antitrust 
Regulation entered in force, the Commission often closed proceedings on suspected 
infringements through these informal agreements made with undertakings concerned
49
, 
without, however, disposing with legal basis to ensure their enforcement. 
ii.) No decision on infringement 
Beside this, with a formal commitment decision the undertakings could be assured that, 
in case commitments meet the Commission’s concerns, the Commission would not take 
further measures: “Commitment decisions should find that there are no longer grounds 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Article 9. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:l:2003:001:0001:0025:en:PDF  
45
 773/2004 EC 
46
 Article 7 1/2003 
47
 Point 13 of the Preamble of the Regulation determines also the scope of the application of the decision 
making commitments to cases when a fine would not be appropriate (this therefore exclude commitments 
in hardcore cartel cases.) 
Commission Memo 04/217 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04-217_en.htm?locale=en 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Article 9. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:l:2003:001:0001:0025:en:PDF  
49
 Commission Memo 04/217 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04-217_en.htm?locale=en  
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for action by the Commission without concluding whether or not there has been or still 
is an infringement.”50 This point can be an important element to the undertaking under 
investigation, as this formal settlement leads to avoid consequent negative publicity.
51
  
iii.) Reassessment 
According to the Regulation, however, the Commission may, upon request or on its 
own initiative, reassess the case if any material change takes place in any of the facts, or 
if undertaking concerned acts contrary to its commitments, or either if decision was 
based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information.
52
 It is also possible for the 
undertaking to ask the Commission to lift a commitment that is no longer appropriate.  
iv.) Follow up 
In sum, the company to whom the decision is addressed must respect the conditions of 
the settlement. Otherwise, the Commission can impose a fine on it amounting up to 
10% of their turnover, and also periodic penalty payments are possible until it complies 
with the commitments.
53
  
v.) Legal force 
There are, moreover, two other points which are to be mentioned and expressed by the 
Commission as important effects of a commitment decision: The first is that in spite of 
the Commission’s decision, according to the shared competence laid down it the 
Council Regulation, national competition authorities and national courts can still 
enforce commitments by any means provided for by the national law and can state that 
there is an infringement. Secondly, as a commitment decision is silent on regarding the 
breach of EU competition rules, a customer or a competitor seeking private enforcement 
in national courts still needs to prove the illegality of the former behavior to obtain 
compensation for damages.
54
  
 
2. Back to Google’s antitrust scrutiny 
 
2.1. The opening of proceedings 
  
In the formal opening of antitrust investigation the Commission drawn up the following: 
i.) Whether Google has abused a dominant market position in online search by allegedly 
lowering the ranking of unpaid search results of competing services which are 
specialized in providing users with specific online content and by according preferential 
placement to the results of its own vertical search services in order to shut out 
competing services. 
ii.) Whether Google lowered the “Quality Score” for sponsored links of competing 
vertical search services. The Quality Score is one of the factors that determine the price 
paid to Google by advertisers. If two advertisers are using the same key words, the site 
                                                          
50
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Preamble (13) 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:l:2003:001:0001:0025:en:PDF  
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 Commission Memo 04/217 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04-217_en.htm?locale=en  
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Article 9. 
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which has a lower Quality Score will have to offer a higher price to rank at the same 
place. 
iii.) Whether Google imposes exclusivity obligations on advertising partners, preventing 
them from placing certain types of competing ads
55
 on their web sites, as well as on 
computer and software vendors, with the aim of shutting out competing search tools. 
iv.) Finally, whether Google imposes restrictions on the portability of online advertising 
data to competing online advertising platforms.
56
 
The Commission also added, this initiation did not imply that the Commission had 
proof of any infringements. It only signified that the Commission would conduct an in-
depth investigation of the case as a matter of priority.
57
  
 
2.2. Additional complaints 
 
This opening was followed by numerous complaints. A number of them were 
transferred to the Commission by the German competition authorities where three 
further companies filed for proceeding mainly focused on the preferential treatment of 
Google’s own services.  
This followed Microsoft’s important formal complaint concerning58: 
i.) Google’s technical measures that are preventing Bring, Microsoft’s search engine 
from indexing content on YouTube – which is owned by Google.  
ii.) Google’s other measures that enable its own Android phones to access YouTube so 
that users can search for video categories, find favorites, see ratings, and so forth in the 
rich user interface offered by these phones. The same thing was done for the iPhones 
offered by Apple, which doesn’t offer a competing search service.  
Google refused to allow Microsoft’s new Windows Phones to access this YouTube 
metadata in the same way that Android phones and iPhones do. As a result, Microsoft’s 
You Tube application on Windows Phone is basically just a browser displaying 
YouTube’s mobile website, without the rich functionality offered on competing phones. 
Microsoft claimed that it needed a permission to access YouTube in the way that other 
phones already do, as Microsoft was ready to release a high quality YouTube app for 
Windows Phones. Google, however, refused to provide this permission. 
iii.) Google’s effort to control the access to the large volume of so-called “orphan 
books” through its Google Books search engine. Orphan books are books for which no 
copyright holder can readily be found. Microsoft referred to a federal court decision in 
New York rejecting Google’s plan under which only Google’s search engine would be 
able to return search results from these books. According to the federal court’s decision 
“Google’s ability to deny competitors the ability to search orphan books would rather 
entrench Google’s market power in the online search market,” 
Microsoft stressed the importance of this initial step under U.S. law and added that it 
needed to be reinforced by similar positions in Europe and the rest of the world. 
iv.) Google’s restrictions on advertisers, its consumers, which limit them to move their 
own advertising data to competing advertising platform.  
                                                          
55
 “Ads” are online advertisements. 
56
 An online advertising platform is a virtual marketplace that brings together advertisers and publishers 
offering advertising space on the internet. 
57
 European Commission Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations 
by Google” IP/10/1624, 30. 11. 2010 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en 
58
 Microsoft’s allegations in relation to Commission’s investigation can be found at: 
http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2011/03/30/adding-our-voice-to-concerns-
about-search-in-europe.aspx 
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In its complaint, Microsoft explained well the significance of such behavior: 
Advertisers input a large amount of data into Google’s ad servers in the course of 
managing their advertising campaigns. It belongs to the advertisers it reflects their 
decision on their own business, but Google contractually prohibits them from using 
their data “in an interoperable” way with other search advertising platform.  
Basically, as Microsoft explains, the problem with these restrictions is that this makes 
too expensive for advertisers to port their data to competing platforms, and advertisers 
thus simply won’t do it. “Competing search engines are left with less relevant ads, and 
less revenue. And while this restraint isn’t visible to consumers, its effects are 
nonetheless felt across the Web.” Advertising revenue is indispensable for search 
investments and “by reducing competitors’ ability to attract advertising revenue, this 
restriction strikes at the heart of a competitive market.” 
v.) Google’s exclusivity terms which block leading websites in Europe from distributing 
competing search boxes. “It is obviously difficult for competing search engines to gain 
users when nearly every search box is powered by Google.” An example concerning 
Microsoft is the way Google, through its exclusivity terms imposed on European 
telecommunication companies, blocked Microsoft from distributing its Windows Live 
services, such as email and online document storage, because these services are 
monetized through Bing search boxes. 
In addition, Microsoft shared concerns expressed by many others that Google apply 
dissimilar conditions to potential competitors by making it more costly for them to 
attain prominent placement for their advertisement. 
Finally, the well-known Expedia and TripAdvisor joined the complainants claiming that 
Google’s preferential treatment of its own services places competing travel websites in a 
competitive disadvantage and forecloses competition in the online travel market.   
 
2.3. Commission’ preliminary statement59  
 
The Commission conducted a comprehensive investigation into allegations described 
above and, on the 21 May 2012, and annunciated that the Commission reached its 
preliminary conclusions. 
According to Commission’s preliminary view, Google is dominant in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) in both in web search and search advertising. All specialized 
search services of Google were covered by the investigation, as long as they are subject 
to a specific treatment in Google’s web search results, including not only existing 
specialized search services but also potentially new specialized search services which 
Google would roll out in the future.
60
   
The Commission identified four main areas in relation to the alleged anti-competitive 
practices where Google would abuse of its dominance.  
i.) Preferential treatment of its own services 
The first concern was in relation to the manipulation of search results and whether 
Google favors its own vertical services differently than it does for its rivals’ link. In its 
general search results Google displays links to its own vertical search services 
differently than it does for links to competitors.  
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 Speech/12/372 Joaquìn Almunia Vice Presidenf of the European Commission, responsible of 
competition policy. Statement of VP Almunia on the Google Antitrust Investigation, Brussels, 21 May, 
2012. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-372_en.htm 
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 European Commission Press Release IP 13/371 Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on 
Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns 25/04/2013 
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The Commission was concerned that it might result in preferential treatment compare to 
those of competing services, without informing users of its favorable treatment.   
Due to this preferential treatment consumers are more likely to not make of use of 
potentially more relevant competing services, and are thus foreclosed from choosing. 
“Since Google is an important source of traffic for vertical search services. This conduct 
may result in reduction competitive incentive to innovate in specialized search.”61 
ii.) Content usage without authorization 
The second concern was in relation to the way Google copies content from third party 
websites without authorization, mainly competing vertical services, using this content in 
its own offerings. The Commission’s position is that by copying competitors’ content, 
Google weakens rivals’ profit and thus reduces their incentives to invest in creating 
original content to the detriment of consumers. 
iii.) Exclusivity agreements with publishers  
The third concern was in relation to the exclusivity deals between Google’s partners are 
constrained to obtain all or most of their advertisement from Google, thereby 
foreclosing competing providers of search advertising intermediation services and the 
choice of online search advertisement that competitors can offer to users in their 
websites are reduced.
62
 
iv.) Constrains on data portability 
The fourth concern was in relation to data portability and the restrictions that Google 
placed in relation to the advertising campaigns from its platform AdWords.  
In the preliminary statement it was an important point that Joaquìm Almunia expressed 
the willingness of the Commission to settle the case without sending the formal 
statement of objections.  
 
2.4. Google’s proposed commitments63  
 
Google, unsurprisingly, was not agree with the Commission’s concerns and “expressly 
denied any wrongdoing or any liability relating to the Commission’s investigation under 
Article 102 of the Treaty”.  
Google, however, for the first time made a proposal on the following commitments in 
accordance with Article 9 of the Antitrust Regulation accepting legally binding changes 
to its search results and went much further in comparison to its minor concessions made 
to the Federal Trade Commission in its inquiry. 
i.) As far as the preferential treatment of its own vertical search services are concerned, 
Google offered as follows: 
Commission’s concern in relation to this practice was the lack of transparency towards 
internet users. In order to provide users with the necessary information, Google offered 
a label with its vertical search results in case, in response to a query, its general search 
box links to its specialized results. Labels would be accessible to users via clearly 
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visible icon and would inform them that the links to Google’s own vertical search 
services have been added by Google to provide access to them, so that users do not 
confuse links to Google’s own vertical services with links to other horizontal web 
search results. Also, where applicable, the label would inform users of where, in its 
horizontal web search results, they can find links to other vertical web search services.  
Google also offered to distinguish its own vertical search services from other horizontal 
web search results to make users be aware of the difference of their nature. 
Finally, for specialized search results that Google monetizes, Google would display on 
the general search results three relevant competing search services selected on the basis 
of mechanisms aimed of ensuring their relevance to the search query. These remedy 
links would lead, where possible, to the results page of third party vertical search site 
for the same query that the user entered on Google.  
Google’s position was that these measures would provide users with additional means 
to exercise an informed choice. Users, therefore, are made aware of the nature of the 
links in question and are enable to access third party vertical search results for their 
queries that enter on Google. 
ii.) Equally, as the commitment offered by Google to the American authorities in 
relation to its conduct of content appropriation, Google would offer third party websites 
a web-based opt-out from the use of all content crawled from their site in Google’s 
vertical search services, without unduly affecting the ranking of those websites in 
Google general web search results. Also, newspaper publisher established within the 
EEA will be enabled to control the display of their content, on a web page by web page 
basis, on Google News. 
iii.) Concerning Google’s partner websites on which Google delivers search 
advertisements, Google commits to no longer include in its contracts agreed with 
publishers any provisions or impose any unwritten obligation that would, de jure or de 
facto, oblige publishers to source their requirements for search Ads from Google in a 
way that gives rise to exclusivity with respect to Ads. 
iv.) As regards the forth business practice, Google also committed to no longer impose 
obligations that would prevent advertisers from porting and managing search 
advertising campaigns across competing advertising services.  
The duration of the commitments will be five years and three months from the date on 
which Google receives formal notification of the Commission’s decision pursuant 
Article 9 of the Antitrust Regulation. 
Google will also appoint one or more natural or legal person(s), the ”Monitoring 
Trustee” an independent organ to monitor Google’s compliance with the duties and 
obligations set out in the commitments.  
These commitments would cover the European Economic Area. 
 
2.5. Commitments subject to market testing 
 
It was subject to assessment whether Google’s proposed commitments offered 
constructive and effective solution for Commission concerns and the Commission 
invited interested parties to submit comments on the proposal.
64
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However, the commitments failed in the market testing phase of the inquiry where 
Google’s competitors expressed their concerns which then led to the rejection of the 
proposal by the Commission and Google was asked to improve its offer.
65
 
The main objection focused on Google’s most important proposition to label its own 
services and show links to competitors which, according to rivals, would continue to 
attract users to Google’s own product by using prime placement and rich graphics. 
 
3. The latest round of negotiation 
 
Google’s second try was again unsatisfactory and rejected but the European 
Commission still preferred to reach a legally binding commitment decision to conclude 
the competition case on Google’s internet search and advertising business.66 
Regarding the Commission’s concern on the favorable treatment of Google’s own 
services on its page, three issues were of critical importance to the Commission in the 
latest discussion with Google: First, given this importance of the choice of visual 
formats in attracting user clicks, it is essential that the presentation of rival links is 
comparable to that of the Google services. Secondly, given the speed with which 
Google develops its services, that comparability of presentation of rival links has to be 
ensured dynamically over time. This means that if Google improves the presentation of 
its services, so much the presentation of rival links. Finally, in a fast moving market, 
any commitments must retain their relevance throughout their lifetime. This means that 
any new vertical search services developed by Google must also be subject to the 
commitments.
67
  
In its proposal Google accepted to guarantee to display the services of three rivals, 
selected through an objective method, in a manner that it is clearly visible to users and 
comparable to the way in which Google displays its own services. Links to the three 
rivals would be shown next to the three Google specialized results with pictures of the 
same size and quality as Google’s own. Rivals would have the full control of how their 
links look and where they take the server. 
On mobile, one rival link would be displayed directly with a picture. There would be a 
number of additional Google and rival results if the user chooses to scroll across the 
screen. It was a significant improvement compared to Google’s previous proposal 
where rivals were only accessible after going through an intermediary screen and where 
even at that point they would not have the possibility to display a picture. Regarding 
local search the three rival links, which have a logo and descriptive text, would be 
prominently displayed on top of the Google’s specialized results. On tablets as well, 
high degree of prominence would be ensured for rival links.
68
  
The objective mechanism to the selection of rivals would consist of choosing them 
based on their ranking in natural search, and they would not be charged to participate in 
the rival links where Google does not charge for inclusion in its specialized search 
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service, such as in local search. Where Google charges merchants for inclusion in its 
specialized service, such as shopping, the three rivals would be chosen on the basis of a 
dedicated and transparent auction mechanism.
69
  
Regarding the Commission other concerns, Google’s concessions had already been 
considered significant.
70
  
 
4. Statement of Objection relating to Google on comparison shopping service 
 
After the unsuccessful efforts to reach a conclusion by a negotiated settlement, in 2015 
Margrethe Vestager, Joaquìn Almunia’s successor as European Commissioner for 
competition adopted a rather different approach to Google’s antitrust case: Today, the 
Commission, narrowing the scope of the case to Google shopping service, aims to set 
broad principles which would be applied to other products and practices.
71
 
 
In April 2015 the Commission sent a Statement of Objection (SO), outlining the 
Commission’s preliminary view that Google is abusing a dominant position, in breach 
of EU antitrust rules, by systematically favoring its own comparison shopping product 
in its general search page in the European Economic Area (EEA). The Commission is 
concerned that users do not necessarily see the most relevant results in response to 
queries – to the detriment of consumers and rival comparison shopping services, as well 
as stifling innovation.
72
 
 
The preliminary conclusion in the SO states that general online search service market 
and comparison shopping service markets are two different markets, and while 
concerning general search in European countries Google is dominant, in comparison 
shopping service it faces competition from a number of providers. Comparison 
shopping services allow consumer to search for products on online shopping websites 
and compare prices between different sellers. Google’s comparison shopping service 
has been provided since 2002 by “Froogle”, which was replaced by “Google Product 
Search”, which in turn was replaced by “Google Shopping”.  
 
According to the preliminary conclusion: 
i.)Google systematically positions and prominently displays its own comparison 
shopping service in its general search result pages, irrespective of its merits. 
 
ii.)Google does not apply the system of penalties to its own service, which is applied to 
other comparison shopping services, which can lead to lower competitors’ rank in 
Google’s general search result pages. 
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iii.)Froogle, Google’s first comparison shopping service was not treated more favorably 
and performed poorly. 
 
iv.)As a result of favoring systematically its comparison shopping service - Google 
Shopping and its predecessor Google Product Search - the company experienced higher 
rates of growth to the detriment of competitors’ services. 
 
v.)Finally, Google’s conduct has negative impact on consumers and innovation, as users 
do not necessarily see the most relevant comparison shopping result. The incentives to 
innovate from rivals are lowered, as they know that however good their product, they 
will not benefit from the same prominence as Google’s products.73 
 
The Statement of Objection took therefore the preliminary view that in order to remedy 
the conduct, Google should treat its own comparison shopping services and those of 
rivals in the same way so that the most relevant services would be selected in response 
to users’ query.74 
 
Google filed its response on the 27
th
 of August 2015. Documents are confidential, but 
the company’s general counsel Kent Walker outlined his defense in a blog spot 
describing the European Commission’s preliminary conclusions as “wrong as matter of 
fact, law and economics.
75
 The general counsel’s statement says that Google in its 
response points out why the company finds the Commission’s allegations incorrect and 
why it believes that “Google increases choice for European consumers and offers 
valuable opportunities for businesses of all size”.76 Kent Walker claims that instead of 
harming competitors’ price comparison services, “the universe of shopping services has 
seen an enormous increase in traffic from Google, diverse new players, new 
investments, and expanding consumer choice.”77 According to Google’s view, the 
Commission is wrong not to consider the impact of major shopping services like 
Amazon and eBay when defines Google’s competitors. Google also rejects the 
Commission’s proposed remedy requiring that Google shows products sourced and 
ranked by other companies within its advertising space, as it would harm the quality of 
search results and legally would be justified only where a company has a duty to supply 
its own competitors, typically concerning companies providing essential services such 
as gas or electricity. 
78
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If its defense fails, Google faces a fine amounting up to 10% of its annual turnover and 
it can lead to significant alteration to its business practices. The Statement of Objection 
relates to the concern regarding Google’s comparison service. In the context of that 
concern, the Commission continues to actively investigate Google’s conduct as regard 
the alleged more favorable treatment of other specialized search services such as travel 
price comparison or local directories. The Commission also continues to actively 
investigate Google’s conduct with regard to the other three concerns.79    
 
Even when the Statement of Objection is already issued, Google still has the possibility 
to negotiate a settlement by offering commitments to remedy Commission’s concerns. 
Therefore, at the time of this writing, whether the Commission resolves the Google-case 
through settlement or provides precedent through a formal finding of infringement, 
remains to be seen.    
  
V. Conclusion 
 
1. Article 102 TFEU- an overview 
 
Article 102 of the Treaty prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal 
market. Together with the cartel prohibition (Article 101) and the rule on State Aid 
(Article 107) embodies the core of EU competition rules. 
As we saw, the European Commission, as the European Competition Authority enforces 
Article 102. Decision by the Commission may be appealed to the General Court and the 
Court of Justice.   
The prohibition on abuse only applies to undertakings with a dominant position. Hence, 
the assessment of dominance is essential. The first element, a necessary precondition in 
a finding of dominance is the determination of the relevant market, which in certain 
circumstances might not be as evident as it appears. 
 
2. Market problems – Competition assessment 
 
As it has already been referred to, web-based markets are characterized by very high 
market shares held by a very limited number of competitors. When companies have 
strong position on these markets, they attempt to use this position to foreclose other 
markets. However, dominance in the internet is difficult to establish. The real question 
is the effective degree of the contestability of these markets.
80
  
Google realizes its business in a two-sided market, with the particularity of having two 
distinct user groups, where one group on one side of the platform tends to realize more 
value when there are more users on the other side. Google provides a service that 
attracts users, who in turn attract the advertisers. As a classical “advertising-supported” 
media, the number of users determines the value of the market. Google offers charge-
free services for users, while earns all its revenues from advertisers, which may help it 
to refine and develop its search functionalities of its search engine.
81
  
                                                          
79
 Press Release Memo/15/4781: Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on 
comparison shopping services, Brussel, 15 April 2015 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm  
80
 UCL News: Competition will strengthen Europe’s digital economy 
 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-articles/1007/10070802  
81
 Szilágyi Pál: A kétoldalú piacok versenyjogi megítélése a médiapiacokra tekintettel [Two-sided media 
markets], In Medias Res, 2012/1 
http://media-tudomany.hu/laparchivum.php?ref=15#footnote-19229-24-backlink  
22 
 
These markets require particular concern when it comes to market assessment. Prices 
and profits are linked on the two sides and each side of the platform exerts some 
constraint on the other. This interdependence between the two sides is the essential 
point to be assessed. Within this context, even the basic concepts such as the definition 
of the market or the assessment of market power can be difficult but at least different 
from the one-sided market analysis. 
 
2.1. Market definition difficulties 
 
The relevant market includes all the products with which the product in question may 
compete, with which there is a sufficient degree of substitutability. 
The test used by competition authorities to define the relevant market is the Small but 
Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price or SSNIP-test: If price increase leads 
to a loss due to lower demand, it means that the product has available substitutes which 
need to be included in the relevant market. If price increase induces revenue, there is a 
lock of available substitutes. The larger the relevant market is, the less likely dominance 
will be found on this market.
82
 
In two-sided markets the SSNIP-test can’t be applied without modifications: 
Hypothetical increase in price is not interpretable on the side where users use the 
platform for free, and the test can be less profitable on side where the value of the 
product is determined by the number of users.  
 
2.2. Product and geographical market definition 
 
Focusing on Google’s case, the Commission has identified relevant product and 
geographical markets in relation to the case Google/DoubleClick merger
83
 and 
perceived online and offline advertising as separate markets stating that online 
advertising is much more capable of reaching the targeted audience.
84
 (According to the 
Commission, the market for online advertising could be separated into search and non-
search relating advertising, but there was no conclusion on this point.)  
Furthermore, the Commission identified a separate market for intermediation in 
advertising services and other separate market for the provision of ad serving 
technology – with even more subdivisions between services to advertisers and to 
publishers.
85
 
These relevant markets defined above are related to online advertising. However, it is 
important to recall that not all of the companies complaining in relation to Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct are operating in this field
86
 and it can be stated that Google is 
much more than only a platform for online advertising, offering search engine services, 
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software application (Gmail, Google Talk), content exploitation (YouTube) and other 
services as AdSense.  
Therefore, the relevant product markets may rather be defined as the market for online 
advertising services, the market for internet search results and the market for vertical 
search results. 
As far as the geographical market definition is concerned – as the relevant market is 
also a geographical dimension -, the Commission’s market investigation confirmed that 
the market for online and serving technology is at least EEA-wide.
87
 
However, at this point perhaps one observation can be made when analyzing separately 
the relevant markets defined above. The accessibility of the internet is world-wide but 
users’ preferences are connected to national or linguistic factors. While conditions for 
competition are similar on the market for internet search, as far as the market for 
vertical search and online advertising are concerned, these markets seem to be more 
oriented nationally, as conditions for competition are likely to vary much more.  
 
2.3. Google’s dominance and abuse of this position 
 
When assessing Google’s position, even though it holds a very large market share, 
competitive restraints may be taken account. 
It was already subject to assessment that market contestability, the degree of 
substitutability and the barriers to entry led the European Commission to consider 
Google as being dominant in the relevant market.  
Having a dominant position, however, is not prohibited under Article 102, but an 
undertaking in this situation carries a special responsibility “not to allow its conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition in the internet market”88.  
According to the European Court of Justice (The Court of Justice of the European 
Union) the abuse is an “objective concept” which relates to the behavior of an 
undertaking in a dominant position that influences the structure of either a market where 
the dominance were established or an adjacent market, where the degree of competition 
is weakened, with the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition 
still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.
89
  
Abuses mentioned in its non-exhaustive list of Article 102, may be distinguished into 
two main categories: exploitative abuses (such as imposing unfair prices or trading 
conditions) and exclusionary abuses (such as contractual tying or refusing to deal).   
Google’s questioned practices most likely fall in the category of exclusionary abuse. 
Below, I will consider the alleged anti-competitive practices one-by-one: 
i.) Due to Google’s practice to intervene in its search results in order to give its own 
websites a higher ranking, some online markets are foreclosed to rivals and new 
entrants. 
Although it can be argued whether this is a normal competitive behavior, the ECJ ruled 
that a dominant undertaking that refuses to supply a competitor in a derivative market 
                                                          
87
 No COMP. M.4731. Google/DoubleClick 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_ 
en.pdf 
88
 Case 322/81 “Michelin v. Commission” (1983)  
http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=
61981J0322  
89
 Case 85/76 “Hoffmann-La Roche v. Comission” (1979) 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61976J
0085&lg=en  
24 
 
because it wishes to enter this market itself, abuses its dominance under Article 102 of 
the Treaty.
90
 
As Google is held dominant and it is demonstrated that the alleged practices actually 
occur, both the downgrading of rival’ web pages in unpaid search results and the 
manipulation of paid search results is deemed abusive.  
ii.) The complaint on harming competitors by copying third party content in order to 
generate advertising revenue without paying any remuneration was made by a German 
publisher association. German newspapers and magazines claimed for payments for 
content used in Google’s news services and search results.91 (Google shows hyperlinks 
to news messages for third parties’ websites.) 
Content publishers’ concerns were related to the fact that Google is earning money by 
using their content for free, without offering them any share of the advertising revenue. 
It is more related to infringement of IPR’s that possible abuse of dominance. If Google 
has the right to show the third party content under relevant intellectual property laws, 
the lack of payment should not be perceived as an abuse of dominance. If, However, the 
content is in public domain, users are able to view it for free, and thus, as several studies 
refer to this problem, there wouldn’t be any reason to share its revenue with third parties 
for content that Google has access to for free.  
iii.) Anticompetitive contractual restrictions on advertising partners are exclusivity 
obligations which may generally be considered abusive if Google is an unavoidable 
trading partner.  
Exclusivity has to be assessed in the light of their potential foreclosure effect on 
competition, and thus the detailed assessment of the terms and condition of exclusivity 
agreements and the effects on consumer welfare is essential. 
iv.) As far as constraints on data portability are concerned, the question is whether 
denying rivals’ access to its content and data, and effecting rival search engines ability 
to provide the same quality as Google can provide, may be perceived as an abuse of 
dominance and if so, an intervention as appropriate remedy to grant access in favor of 
rivals may considerable as granting access to its strategic assets and can even lead to 
details on its protected algorithm. 
 
VI. Final remarks 
 
In the context of these fast-moving markets where technology and product innovation 
play the key role, market players’ conduct is subject of further and careful assessment. 
Online platforms are innovators in the digital economy, helping smaller businesses to 
move online and reach new markets. These platforms generate and control huge amount 
of data about their customers and use algorithms to turn this into usable information. 
Depending on the size and the use of their market power, they are able to control access 
to online markets which may raise important competition concerns. 
In the new economy competition would be dynamic: The most successful market player 
innovator shall dominate the whole market. This dominant position is nevertheless 
fragile, because if another competitor innovates successfully, it may in turn take over 
the whole market. “There would be monopoly for a while, which would be succeeded 
by another monopoly, so that competition would be dynamic.” This dynamism is the 
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key role of economic growth.
92
 There is, however, a real possibility that a firm 
establishing a temporary dominance had a variety of mechanism by which it could 
perpetuate that temporary position. “As a result, the overall level of innovation would 
be suppressed.”93 
New economy entails huge network externalities, which may easily led to enormous 
market dominance, as trough Google’s case it was earlier demonstrated in this paper. 
However, this dominance is caused by the fact that it is used by many people, not 
because the dominant technology is the more efficient. “There is a certain irony in the 
fact that New Economy has in some respect increased competition and the potential for 
competition, while at the same time these network externalities and the way they have 
been abused have actually reduced competition.”94   
This is the central feature of the European Commission’s argument when it proceeds 
with caution while evaluating the market players’ conduct to apply appropriate 
measures to ensure the natural competitive process between competitor market players 
while it is doing its best to serve consumers. 
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